The US food industry faces tobacco-style lawsuits for providing misleading information about health risks linked to the consumption of fatty products. This paper investigates the link between alternative liability rules and the incentive for disclosing health information to consumers. We show that if the expected damage is relatively low, the absence of intervention is socially optimal. If the expected damage is not too high, mandatory labeling is socially optimal. Liability rules are only welfare-enhancing for high levels of risk and/or when consumers misperceive health warnings.
Introduction
Recent studies on the health consequences of obesity have shown that overeating may be as dangerous as smoking in terms of life expectancy (Sturm and Wells). Abuse of alcohol, cigarettes and/or fa(s)t food increases loss of human lives and health care costs.
This raises the question of the best policy response through alternative instruments such as taxation, liability, information campaigns (health-warnings) or advertising restrictions.
1 These policies are designed to decrease consumption, either by influencing prices, raising consumer awareness or limiting access to products. For instance, liability payments have been imposed due to the lack of information about health-risks provided by tobacco companies to consumers (Bulow and Klemperer) . The US fast-food industry faces similar lawsuits for misleading advertising or absence of information about risks as we describe in the next section.
This article analyzes the complex interaction between liability, information about risks and consumer demand. Specifically, we seek to answer the question: should regulators or courts rely on health-labeling or on tort law for regulating and limiting "dangerous consumption"? This question is important since recent legal attempts to hold the US fast-food industry responsible for obesity are likely to extend to that part of the agri-business sector that produces high energy foods. To address this question, we adopt a normative approach that could provide some guidelines for regulators and/or courts.
The impacts of alternative liability rules and a mandatory labeling policy are detailed in a market context (Cournot competition) and compared with the position of a regulator who seeks to maximize welfare, taking into account profits of firms, consumer surplus and social damages. Liability rules provide (complete or partial) compensation to consumers and reduce output and profits of firms, while mandatory labeling enables consumers to make better choices with respect to health risks. We consider several liability rules, namely strict liability, the negligence rule and the comparative negligence rule gaining momentum in many US states. These rules allow to consider different divisions of the burden for an accident on the plaintiff and defendant, based on the revealed information or the level of preventive care.
We show that if the expected damage is relatively low, the absence of intervention is socially optimal since price/quantity distortions are avoided. In particular, informing consumers is not optimal even if the cost of information is zero.
2 If the expected damage is relatively large, liability rules are not efficient for regulating the market due to the insolvency of firms. In most cases, mandatory labeling is sufficient and essential for maximizing welfare and reducing consumption (and obesity). Liability rules are essential for maximizing welfare only for high levels of risk and/or if consumers misperceive health warnings.
The literature on this topic has overlooked the links between information, insolvency of firms and market structure. Polinsky and Rogerson focus on the optimality of alternative liability rules in a market context, when consumers misperceive risks. However, they do not consider the insolvency problem, they take consumer risk perception as exogenous and they do not study the efficiency of a comparative negligence rule. Conversely, in this article, insolvency is endogenous to the market structure, which limits the efficiency of liability tools, consumer perception of risks may be improved through (mandatory or voluntary) disclosure of information, and comparative negligence may be a tailored instrument for capping consumption.
The economic literature on obesity has modeled consumer behavior and discounting issues (Cutler, Glaeser and Shapiro) , but few articles have conducted a normative analysis of the public regulation issue. More generally, while many empirical articles focus on either the effects of taxes (Grossman, Sindelar, Mullahy and Anderson) or advertising bans (Safer and Chaloupka) for lowering any kind of "dangerous consumption", we investigate the effects of alternative instruments on market mechanisms. Daughety The second section of the article focuses on the recent attempts to sue hamburger restaurant chains in the US, and the model is described in the third section.
The main results are presented in the fourth, while the fifth provides some extensions, and the final section concludes.
The Fast-Food Industry and Pending Liability
Obesity and related illnesses are linked to some 300,000 deaths and $117 billion in health care costs a year in the United States (Sturm and Wells), where 60% of the population is overweight with 31% considered obese (Fountain) . Unhealthy food habits, together with an increasingly sedentary life style, have contributed to this situation. This could lead some states with public health problems to consider food companies as partly responsible.
Even though food habits result from conscious choices, 3 one aspect of the debate on whether food companies should be held liable for obesity is misleading advertising or lack of information about risks. This is particularly true for large companies because of (1) high concentration in food manufacturing and (2) Recently, a US district judge dismissed an "attempt by four overweight teenagers to sue McDonald's" and decided that the potential risks were "within the common knowledge of consumers" (Buckley 2003a, pp.1) . However, there is a possibility that the plaintiffs appeal against this decision. As Buckley (2003b) notes (pp.13) "the judge even suggested that the fast-food chain's Chicken McNuggetswhich he labelled a 'McFrankenstein creation' stuffed with additives and containing twice the fat by weight of a hamburger -might fall into that category" (of cases that could be refiled in the court). Beyond the wide skepticism about the lack of consumer awareness of the link between fast-food consumption and obesity, food companies face serious threats of lawsuits in the future. The argument is, while you cannot stop tobacco from being dangerous, you can make food less unhealthy.
In 2003, two legislative proposals that would make consumers responsible for what they eat were introduced in the U.S. Congress in order to impede obesity-related lawsuits against food manufacturers (Congress 2003 (Congress , 2004 to consumer concerns by changing the way they make, package and promote their food.
McDonald's announced the switch to a healthier cooking oil in order to reduce the trans fat content of fried items. 4 Kraft Foods plans to reduce the portion size and some calories of its products, a move that other food companies are expected to mimic (Horovitz) .
The debate about the strategies of firms and the appropriate regulation will likely gain momentum. As Buckley (2003b) reports, "Food makers will have to revamp their marketing, removing advertising that promotes over-consumption and running campaigns linked with physical activity -as many companies are already doing. 'Any food company that thinks it can get through this without changing anything is kidding itself,' says the executive [of a food company]. 'You can see the collision course that is coming. It's either going to be regulation, legislation or litigation' " (pp.13). This last point directly leads to the topic of this article.
Although the judicial accountability of the food industry for obesity raises many questions, we focus on one central economic aspect of the debate, namely the link between information, liability and consumer demand. A simple model is proposed for measuring the impact of alternative liability rules and/or information on consumer reaction and market mechanisms (alternative assumptions will be discussed at the end of the paper). It aims at determining the second best policy, that is, the welfare maximizing regulation for a given market structure.
The Model
We consider a market with n identical and risk neutral firms, selling a homogeneous product and incurring no cost of production for simplicity. These firms are aware that an overconsumption of their products may lead to obesity and they can choose whether or not to reveal some information on health risks to (risk neutral) consumers. Health warnings are costless and deliver correct information about risks, but consumers may misperceive them. 5 Firms decide also on the quantity to produce in a Cournot competition context.
On the demand side, we assume an expected direct utility function of a representative consumer : The maximization of (1) under budget constraint ( ) p Q Q v y + = where y denotes consumer income leads to the following inverse demand function :
With respect to the regulatory environment, we restrict our attention to regulations based on liability and on information (the case for taxation will be briefly mentioned in a subsequent section). Obesity may correspond to what the law and economics literature considers a "bilateral accident" where prevention is possible both on the industry side (by selling reasonable quantities and/or providing information about the risks linked to the consumption of fatty foods) and on the consumer side (by having a healthy diet that is "appropriate consumption"). As appropriate behavior for consumers with respect to consumption is hard to verify, we take for granted that both sides of the market may have responsibilities in case of damage (that is declared obesity) and we therefore denote α as a firm's legal share of responsibility in obesity,
α ∈ , , and (1 ) α − remains the consumer's burden.
The parameter α also captures the variety of regulatory regimes we consider.
Under a regime of no regulation (rule A), the whole responsibility is placed on consumers for their own obesity; 0 α = . Conversely, under strict liability (rule B), firms are liable whenever obesity is declared; 1 α = , whatever firms' efforts for informing consumers about risks.
Given the "bilateral accident" aspect of obesity, regimes of comparative negligence used by many US states may be advocated. Under comparative negligence (rule C), the costs linked to obesity are shared between firms and consumers, based on the level of preventive care of each party. We assume that the portion of the cost shouldered by firms depends on their information policy: the liability payment is lower if they disclose health warnings to consumers than if they do not disclose. Let α be the share of responsibility linked to obesity when there is disclosure and α the share of responsibility without disclosure, with 0 1 α α < < < . These shares are considered as exogenous (they result from courts' past behavior) and they are public knowledge.
Negligence rule (D) describes the case where firms bear no responsibility when they provide some information. Firms bear complete responsibility when they provide no information. This rule corresponds to a limiting case of the comparative negligence rule, where 0
Eventually, the regulator may also decide to implement a mandatory label (E) or to ban the product (F). The policy selected by the regulator is publicly known to firms and consumers.
A four-stage oligopoly model is considered with a utilitarian regulator who maximizes welfare, accounting for profits of firms, consumer surplus and social damages. In the first stage, the regulator chooses among instruments ( without cost the overall extent of the damage dQ and determines the liability share for each firm. For simplicity, we assume no litigation costs. The only assets available for compensation are the profits of the firm, which may be insufficient to cover the whole liability compensation. 9 We now turn to the characterization of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this four stage game (solved by backward induction) and then conduct a welfare analysis allowing the selection among the different rules.
Firms' Strategies
We successively describe the production choice and the information policy. As firms are assumed symmetric, they select the same strategy.
Output Strategy
The output strategies of firms (in stage 3) influence their ex post solvency via the market price. With a probability λ , no damage occurs. For firm i , producing the output i q , the profit is ( ) i p Q q , where ( ) p Q is the inverse demand defined in (2). With probability (1 ) λ − , damage occurs and firm i is held responsible in proportion to its output. This leads to a liability payment d α i q , where the value of α depends on the regulatory regime selected in stage 1.
If the damage occurs, the profit of the firm is either sufficient or insufficient to cover the liability payment. In the case where the profit is sufficient ( ( )
In the case where the profit is insufficient, the firm is insolvent (or judgment proof) and its profit is completely allocated to compensation. After the liability payment, its profit is driven to zero.
Before producing, the expected profit function depends on the probabilities λ 
(
Note that when no information is disclosed and consumers completely misperceive risks
The expected profit function when the firm i is solvent is:
The expected profit function when the firm i is insolvent is:
with i q − denoting the aggregate output of other firms and
The profit maximization depends on the (in)solvency situation. The best reaction functions associated with these profits for the equilibria under solvency and insolvency are detailed in the appendix. To sum up, let Proof: see the appendix.
The optimal policy
We now turn to the decision of a utilitarian regulator in stage 1, namely the choice of the legal environment that maximizes welfare. The regulator takes into account the equilibrium strategy of the firms (at stages 2 and 3) for choosing the best rule. The regulator choice depends on the value of the (exogenous) risk parameter (1 ) λ − and on the risk misperception parameter µ . To simplify, we characterize the optimal policy for alternative levels of risk and risk perception in separate propositions. Let (1 2 )
The first proposition characterizes the optimal regulation (i) for low levels of risks, or
(ii) for medium levels of risks and a very good understanding of health warnings by consumers ( µ close to zero), since the threshold value 2 λ increases with the consumer misperception parameter µ . since it provides no incentive for firms to disclose information, while firms prefer to be judgment proof if damage occurs (with a low probability). Neither a negligence rule nor a comparative negligence rule is efficient because when the risk is low, it does not provide sufficient incentives for firms to disclose voluntarily health warnings. Indeed mandatory labeling informs consumers and limits their consumption.
For high values of d , the absence of production is optimal since welfare is negative whatever the rules of intervention (A) to (E). All the alternative liability rules are inefficient because it would result in insolvent firms with no information disclosed,
i.e., the same overall welfare than under no regulation, which is negative for
We now turn to situations with intermediate levels of risk. Let We now turn to the situation with a relatively high probability of damage and consumer misunderstanding of labels, or with very high risks. Let Proof : see the appendix [INSERT FIGURE 3] In this case, the labeling and negligence rules are never efficient, because firms can disclaim all responsibility while consumer perception of risks does not result in correct internalization of the damage. Indeed, regulations such that the damage is at least partially internalized by firms (strict liability and comparative negligence rules) are always preferred to sole information. The efficiency of strict liability (which makes firms completely responsible for obesity) is limited by solvency of firms. For large values of d , the comparative negligence rule is preferred, with partial liability payments but disclosure of information.
All three propositions hold under imperfect competition (Cournot setting with n firms). The case for a competitive situation may be captured by allowing n to go to infinity. When n → +∞ , firms profits tend towards zero, so that strict liability, negligence rule or comparative negligence are inefficient for reducing the production of firms. 11 In this case, mandatory labeling would be selected for 
Extensions
In defining the analytical framework, very restrictive assumptions were made for simplicity. Some of the results of the model are robust if we consider the following extensions.
(i) In the model, we abstracted from any labeling or litigation cost. A complete cost-benefit analysis should take into account the cost of determining the optimal regulation to mitigate obesity and related damages. Our results have to be adjusted to allow for administrative costs. A positive cost of liability (information) reinforces the argument for information policy (liability). Our results which relate the insolvency of firms to price/quantity distortions are always a factor in the definition of the optimal regulation.
(ii) We assumed that the court was able to determine the liability share of each firm. Even if this assumption is dropped, it is easy to make the liability payment proportional to firms' market share (which is the same for each firm under our symmetric setting). Without completely knowing the responsibility of each firm, the court may equally allocate liability to symmetric firms. 12 An alternative solution to liability could be a trust fund for compensating victims or financing information policy, avoiding litigation costs and complex procedures for determining precise responsibilities. The companies could put money into a trust fund according to their profits.
(iii) Throughout the model, we assumed that the regulator was acting in the public's best interest. One stumbling block for such regulatory "fairness" is the efficiency of the public regulatory authority itself. Public agencies may be doomed to failure if their mandate is not clearly defined or they suffer from excessive bureaucracy.
Also, we assumed that the regulator and court act with perfect information about firm characteristics or damage. Another extension could examine, first, the consequences of imperfect information about damage, which may reduce the efficiency of liability due to the cost of inspection and/or expertise, and second, the consequences of misleading messages regarding the risks.
(iv) The probability of damage (1 λ − ) was exogenous in the model. The results of the paper would be reinforced if we were to consider a more realistic assumption that the probability depends on consumer' effort. The relevant liability rule would then be the contributory negligence defense which imposes no liability on firms if consumers fail to collect enough information for taking due care. The absence of compensation paid by firms would lead consumers to be responsible for their food consumption behavior.
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(v) The probability of damage (1 λ consumer heterogeneity is to develop targeted information campaigns. Also, we assumed that the misperception parameter µ was the same for every consumers. The perception of messages on risks may vary among the population notably with the age.
Results would be easely derived for each "class of population".
(vi) We only focused on the consumption of one type of good, where demand is influenced by the internalization of consumer losses. An extension would consider demands for different types of goods, namely high-fat or low-fat products, with some imperfect substitutability among these goods. In such a setting, the demand for high-fat products would decrease under the internalization of the loss (as in our model), leading to an increase in the demand for low-fat products. This substitution of low-fat for highfat may be evaluated through econometric estimation, taking into account a complete basket of food products.
(vii) The key point of this model was the effect of liability/information systems on consumer demand, since any regulation aims at affecting consumption. Our analysis should be extended through econometric evaluation regarding the reaction of demand to price variation and/or to information. In our model, we assumed that mandatory labeling shifts the misperception parameter from 1 µ = to 1 µ < . For the tobacco industry, several studies have shown that information campaigns did not have a significant effect on consumption, see, e.g., Sloan, Smith and Taylor, whereas empirical evidence shows that consumers mainly respond to prices. In contrast, Modjuska and Caswell show that mandatory labeling on nutritional quality influences demand in the US. However, if information disclosure is relatively inefficient for reducing demand (with a misperception parameter 1 µ < but close to one) and liability is inoperative due to insolvency, a tax could be useful. Once more, tax efficiency would depend on the demand price-elasticity. A complete cost-benefit analysis would consider the possible combination of all these instruments.
(viii) Throughout the model, we abstract from taxation, while levies on fatty foods or a tax on calories could be used. However, such a tax could be perceived as a regressive tax because it hurts people with healthy behaviors, and people on lower incomes tend to eat proportionally larger quantities of cheap, high-fat food. In our setting, a per-unit tax equal to the per-unit damage (and passed on to consumers via the price) may be imposed by the regulator if, either liability tools entail insolvency or the information policy is unable to improve consumer perception of risk. This tool is a substitute for the instruments presented in this article.
Conclusions
The central economic issue in this article was the effect of liability/information systems on consumer demand. Different rules and their possible combinations were compared from a regulator point of view. We showed that if the expected damage is relatively low, the absence of intervention is socially optimal. While, if the expected damage is relatively large, health warnings are necessary for reaching the optimal social choice. 
APPENDIX

Proof of Lemma 1 : Firms' output strategy
For each firm i, the objective function is given by (5) if the firm expects to be solvent, and by (6) if the firm expects to be judgment proof. Under solvency, firm i's best reaction output to the aggregate output of other firms i q − (with Q= i q
Under a symmetric Cournot setting, if all firms turn to the solvent output strategy, each firm selects an output where all sellers are judgment proof. This is a situation of multiple equilibria (see Marette, Coestier and Gozlan, 2003) . The solvency equilibrium is selected according to 
Proof of Lemma 2 : Firms' information strategy
Under comparative negligence (C), each firm's share of responsibility for the damage is α without information, and α < α if health warnings are disclosed. Negligence is a 
Welfare
Welfare is defined as the sum of expected consumer surplus and expected profits, 
Under a comparative negligence rule, firms disclose health warnings ( 1 
The frontiers determination and proof of propositions
The frontier 4 d defined in (16) λ is zero when 0 µ = , meaning that there is no role for a comparative negligence when a label brings perfect information, i.e., there is no residual misperception), while it is greater than 1 when 1 µ = .
The frontier 6 d defined in (11) comes from the condition of (0 1) 12 This may include class action liability where all the industry has to pay dQ to the victims, where Q denotes the overall level of production of the industry. This overall penalty can be shared among firms according to their production i q , which leads to a per-firm payment equal to i dq .
13 Probability (1 λ − ) may also depend on the firm's effort by the choice of better-quality ingredients, see, e.g., Elbasha and Lynn Riggs. It is possible to extend our results, where λ depends on firms' effort.
Firms' incentives to invest in prevention or quality could be diluted under potential insolvency linked to liability.
